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Abstract: 
In the article the moral notion of utility is examined. By reading 
John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism the paper argues that moral con-
cepts, like the application of utility, incorporates both normative 
and descriptive elements, i.e. it is both abstract and factual in na-
ture. Therefore the paper claims that facts are a vital part of moral 
behavior; and that descriptive elements are essential for normative 
judgment and moral reasoning. The paper supports its claim by 
showing that the moral conceptualization of utility includes the in-
corporation of facts, and that the density, or quality of that incorpo-
ration is equivalent to the certainty and comfort by which the con-
ceptualization is articulated.
Keywords: moral reason, utilitarianism, facts, conceptual delibera-
tion
A concept called utility 
The standard dictionary definition of utility is ‘the state or quality 
of being useful’. In general the notion finds itself in two forms of 
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materials providing services and/or goods, such as electricity, wa-
ter, sanitation, heat, that meets certain basic needs for the modern 
human way of life. The utility of these services and/or goods are 
more or less taken for granted, and the rational concern about them 
is not focused on if they ought to be provided, but on how they can 
be provided. This seems reasonable, since living in a modern ur-
ban environment do call for sewers, power plugs and tap water. 
Referring to the establishment of these services and/or goods as 
utility appears to us as truthfully descriptive; perhaps even in the 
way of a natural kind. It seems ‘natural’ that these provisions are 
useful, since we, from a ‘natural’ point of view, do seem to need 
what they provide.        
However, the notion of utility also finds itself in discourses con-
cerned with if something particular is useful or not. ‘How can we 
use it?’, ‘What are its uses?’, ‘What’s the use?’, ‘Use it like this!’, ‘It 
has many uses!’, ‘Make yourself useful!’ etc. These discourses ad-
dress a broad range of modern human life, and it might apply to 
consumer goods, education, leisure activities, art and craft, as well 
as parking lots, fashion design and a North London Derby. On an-
other note, the particularities, brought into concern about their use-
fulness, could also be institutions, procedures, and sometimes even 
human beings themselves. 
In this second type of discourse the notion utility is often applied 
as an instrument for claiming the acquisition or dismissal, preserva-
tion or change of the particular item in question. In these cases, the 
reason behind the notion utility, is not simple descriptive, i.e. refer-
ring to whether the item is useful or not, but equally normative in 
nature, stating something about what ought to be done to the item, 
i.e. regarding its possession, improvement or disbandment. Here 
utility emerges not just as an epistemic epithet allowing the particu-
lar a dominion of knowledge (e.g. as a natural kind), but also as an 
ethical indicator, turning the particular subject in question into a 
moral issue.  
The state or quality of being useful is conceptualized as some-
thing valuable. The utility possessed by the particulars addressed 
in the first discourse, is a utility be necessity (or by naturalness). 
Therefore the value of the items is not in question. We might even 
say that it is a simple fact, and our dealings with them have a pure 






Discovering utility between the descriptive and the normative
Patrik Kjærsdam Telléus 
In the second discourse however, the utility possessed by the par-
ticulars, or better said the value of the items, is exactly what is at 
stake. It is not a necessity, and therefore not taken for granted, but 
something that calls for an ethical deliberation, that can show itself 
in form of moral reasoning, maybe even as ethical arguments or 
calculations, and sometimes, it comes in the form of – what Mill 
called – transcendent facts. (Mill, 2008/1871: pp. 45)
The pointe I want to make is that when we conceptualize, that is, 
when we are applying notions in situations to things and actions 
etc., we can, individually and collectively, be more or less certain of 
the legitimacy of the concept in use. The certainty and uncertainty 
gives reason for some form of deliberation on the concept, therein 
we try to justify or question the concept further. This deliberation 
can involve elements both on the particular application of the no-
tion at hand, i.e. a form of practical comprehension, as well as on 
the notion itself, i.e. a form of abstract comprehension. Often these 
elements are hard to tell apart, since they interact with each other in 
the process of conceptualization.     
Elsewhere, I have argued for reading significant parts of Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy as a conceptual deliberation. This is to be under-
stood as a process in which certain core concepts are identified, that 
on the one hand a) appear as a form of flipside coins, being both 
descriptive and normative at the same time; and on the other hand 
b) (to use a metaphor) grows into you as a form of bone structure, 
and, although having an empirical genesis, in practice emerge as an 
a priori condition, becoming certainties. (Telléus, 2013) 
A notion like utility is particularly interesting from this wittgen-
steinian perspective. It is a good example of a concept, that in order 
for us to be comfortable in using it, to be certain of its meaning, has 
to be able to ground or relate the concept in a particular practice 
(the descriptive part of the concept), as well as be able to recognize 
and deliberate on the application of the concept’s abstractly justi-
fied value (the normative part of the concept). If something is re-
ferred to by the notion utility, that doesn’t simple mean that we can 
use it for the time being, in this particular setting, for this particular 
purpose; but also that when we use the notion, we find comfort and 
certainty in our usage, by drawing strength and meaning (moral 
value) from an per se a priori idea (or belief) of ‘useful things being 
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thereby the certainty by which we conceptualize utility is depend-
ent on our capacity to adhere to and incorporate both of these two 
aspects more or less as one. This is the case in the ‘natural point of 
view’ in the application of utility from above; a view that also in-
clude the notion of ‘fact’ in terms of articulating this certainty, mak-
ing the moral and the factual almost equivalent – but more on this 
later. In cases, where we are more uncertain and uncomfortable in 
applying the concept of utility, we are at the same time more clear 
on the distinction as well as the interaction between the normative 
elements and the descriptive elements.  
With this in mind, I’d like to look closer at how the notion of 
utility is conceptualized when it is declared as a moral concept, 
facing explicit demands on stating what value is promoted into 
what things and actions, and what better place to look than in 
John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism.
Reading Mill’s Utilitarianism
Coining the term utilitarianism as an attempt to label his moral phi-
losophy, Mill obviously brought the notion utility to the attention of 
moral philosophers. Due to Mills great interest in subjects such as 
sociology, economy and politics, utility quickly spread into these 
scholarly areas as well. Utilitarianism became a school of thought, 
centered on consequentialism, practical (factual) matters, and a cal-
culative approach, paying tribute not only to Mill, but also to his 
father James Mill and to Jeremy Bentham. 
Already in 1900 Leslie Stephen established this representation, 
when he wrote a comprehensive 3-volume introduction to the 
school, or what he called, sect of scholars. (Stephen, 2009/1900) 
One interesting aspect of Stephen’s book is that he chose not to give 
a logical, theoretically coherent interpretation of The English Utili-
tarians, but embedded their thoughts, principles and theories in the 
social structure and historical circumstances of their time, thereby 
presenting a more variable and contextual philosophical paradigm, 
than what is normally appreciated in the tradition of philosophy.    
Mill, his moral philosophy and in particular his famous book 
Utilitarianism has ever since been the subject of much interpretation 
and debate. From the perspective of some interpreters Mill is an act-
consequentialist aiming for maximizing the greatest happiness 
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consequential view or the standpoint of what is normally called a 
multilevel moral theory. (Berger, 1984; Brink, 1992; West, 2004)
There is much evidence of Mill’s ambivalent or pliant or some-
times even reluctant affair with the term and paradigm of utilitari-
anism (Jakobsen, 2003), and reading the book Utilitarianism would 
not allow many readers a clearer or more decisive view. But putting 
these debates aside, at least explicitly, in this paper I focus on read-
ing the concept of utility. 
The scholar Shiri C. Kaminitz (2014) has written an interesting 
paper with a similar intent. She argues that it is important to under-
stand the concept utility in order to understand how Mill applies 
the notion with regard to his moral theory and his political econo-
my respectively. Kaminitz’s claim is that Mill in his very early eco-
nomical thinking negligibly subscribed to a quantitative conception 
of value, an almost mechanical concept of utility, exemplified by the 
term homo economicus. However, this view changed with Mill’s later 
intellectual development and especially his friendship and admi-
ration for the romantic philosopher and poet Samuel Coleridge. 
Therefore, in his moral philosophy, Mill developed a qualitative 
concept of utility “that was both more humanistic and more com-
plex than that which Mill had inherited from Bentham.” (Kaminitz, 
2014, p. 244) What Kaminitz wants us to become aware of is that 
anyone applying utility as a consequential calculation of quantified 
data, e.g. analyzing economic statistics, while claiming or justifying 
the normative value of this conceptualization of utility in reference 
to Mill’s utilitarianism is basically wrong. The nuances of the quali-
tative value of utility are lost, and thereby the moral value of utility 
loose its meaning as well as changes its reference. To put it simple, 
the politics of utility should be alert to the difference between ap-
plying an economical utility judgment and a normative utility judg-
ment. The latter incorporating an idea of humanity and emotional 
sensitivity that the former is lacking.
Alasdair MacIntyre, in his Tanner lectures at Princeton in 1994, 
delivers a somewhat similar look on Mill. (MacIntyre, 1995) MacIn-
tyre does not talk about utility as such, but of the concept of truth-
fulness, or truth-telling. In regard to this paper the interesting as-
pect is that he begins his lectures by placing, as tradition holds, Mill 
as a representative of an act-consequentialist utilitarian position ac-
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(personal) cases and circumstances in order to insure the outcome 
as a greater good (this in opposition to a Kantian position of abso-
lute rule-following). But he then looks closer at Mill’s actual account 
and finds something quite different. Mill, in MacIntyre’s reading, 
emerges as a rule-utilitarian, not allowing more than very few (just 
one example is put forth) exceptions to the rule of truth-telling. The 
reason for this is Mill’s argument for the value of truthfulness. The 
normativity of this concept is based on the development of charac-
ter, of become virtuous. Virtue (as part of happiness, which Mill 
argues in chapter 4) is the warrant for truth-telling, not specific ben-
efits and personal well-being. The virtuous upholds truth-telling 
for the sake of civilization, Mill argues, and MacIntyre makes a long 
interpretation of the significance of that statement. By civilization 
Mill, according to MacIntyre, refers to the capacity of being civi-
lized, not to the historical society of e.g. 19th century England, and 
to the qualitative values “acquired only by extended intellectual, 
moral, and emotional enquiry and education.” (MacIntyre, 1995, p. 
330) What MacIntyre is doing is building a claim justifying Mill’s 
moral position based on an idea of man as a bearer of qualified so-
cial reasoning which carries traces both to the romantics (such as 
Coleridge) but also to the vital philosophical figure – and originally 
positioned opponent – Immanuel Kant. Mill, in MacIntyre’s read-
ing, is therefore developed into a spokesman for a moral reasoning 
that places virtues within the life of practical enquiry. However, as 
MacIntyre concludes, “this account that I have given remains deep-
ly at odds with Mill’s consequentialism.” (MacIntyre, 1995, p. 358).  
Through their conceptual analysis’ both Kaminitz and MacIntyre 
revise the view of Mill as an ‘empirical quantified data’ calculation 
consequentialist, and allow for a version of Mill to emerge that has 
a greater focus on, and understanding of, the richness of human 
life, the qualitative development of individuals, and the promotion 
of a complex moral reasoning. In doing this Kaminitz and MacIn-
tyre has to a certain degree to disembark Mill from the paradigm or 
school of utilitarianism, and to some extent even from other aspects 
of Mill’s own philosophy. Going back to Stephen’s presentation of 
Mill’s philosophy, the conceptual approach might not be that irrel-
evant or estranged, since Stephen to some extent also replaces or 
abandon ‘reading a theory of utilitarianism’ (in his case however in 
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Reading Mill’s Utilitarianism, with a conceptual analysis of utility 
in mind, I’m inclined to agree with Kaminitz and MacIntyre. Espe-
cially chapters 2, 3 and 4 carry numerous references to a qualitative 
approach to happiness, included the idea of greater happiness, to 
emotional sensitivity for moral principles, especially the idea of 
consciousness, to social awareness, to development of character, 
and so on. On the basis of this, what I like to emphasize here, is how 
the concept of utility come to arrange itself in terms of the moral 
reasoning that Mill, and perhaps the ‘millian’ version of utilitarian-
ism, advocates. 
There are two important issues to present. First, what actually 
counts as facts, and what role do they play in terms of the rationale 
of utility; and second, how does utility express itself in regard to a 
personal and a common good (or benefit). The simple answer 
might be something like: on the first issue, facts are empirically 
measures quantities, used as components for calculation of maxi-
mization; and on the second issue: utility is a principle, which ap-
plication to the personal and common is determined by the particu-
lar consequential range (the outcome) of the particular act. It is this 
simple answer that the conceptual reading of Mill will complicate. 
In the text Utilitarianism Mill uses the word ‘fact’ 27 times. Mostly 
he uses it to present some account as commonly recognized, indis-
putable or taken for granted. In this sense he talks of something that 
we might call an empirically established sociological fact, or perhaps 
better psychological fact – which is the one definition used by Mill 
himself on 3 occasions. To support his clear epistemic use of fact, 
Mill defines ‘facts’ on a few occasions in terms of authentic, familiar 
and simple, all indicating something unquestionably known to us. 
He also, famously, talks of transcendent facts. This as part of rec-
ognizing a moral reasoning that establishes itself on an ontological 
premise not empirically described, such as God. However, al-
though Mill does not dismiss the transcendent ontology, he makes 
it explicitly clear that a normative judgment cannot solely rest on 
such transcendence. First, he points out, such a judgment or moral 
obligation has to be urged by a subjective feeling, it has to be recog-
nized in and by our minds. Following Mill’s argument on this mat-
ter, it seems clear to me that, in this text, for this purpose, he doesn’t 
distinguish between empirical and transcendent fact, in terms of 
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logical taste or preference. Regardless, we still need and use facts in 
our moral concerns, to anchor and enforce our normative judgment 
and opinion. 
There is also another very interesting occurrence of the notion 
fact in Mill’s Utilitarianism. At the end of chapter two, Mill acknowl-
edges that the withholding of facts (the two examples he gives are 
empirically described human behavior) can be a sufficient reason 
for valid moral exceptions to, as he calls it, an otherwise sacred rule. 
This passage is often used to point at Mill’s consequentialism, since 
it basically allows for someone to tell a lie in order to save someone 
from harm – a desirable consequence overrides a morally acknowl-
edged principle. However, what I’d like to emphasize is that once 
again we see that facts are necessary components in moral reason-
ing. Here they appear as epistemic ‘touchstones’ recognized and 
applied through the experience of particular and real situations. In 
this sense, facts come to inhabit or vacant, or perhaps play out, the 
normativity of e.g. a moral opinion, a moral principle, a moral obli-
gation, etc. In a way, the fact make the moral real, first and foremost 
in an epistemic sense, i.e. make it reasonable for the moral agent, 
but also in an ontological sense. Mill of course, through the main 
number of examples, emphasizes an empirical reality, or much bet-
ter said an experienced reality.     
To summarize this point on facts in Mill’s book, let me quote 
three passages from chapter four. Here Mill writes:
To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all 
first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as 
well as to those of our conduct. But the former, being mat-
ters of fact, may be subject of a direct appeal to the facul-
ties which judge of fact – namely, our senses, and our in-
ternal consciousness. Can an appeal be made to the same 
faculties on questions of practical ends? Or by what other 
faculties is cognizance taken of them? (Mill, 1867, p. 52)
And he continues:  
The only proof capable of being given that an object is vis-
ible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a 
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the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I ap-
prehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that 
anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. 
(Mill, 1863, p. 52f)
And a little further on:
And now to decide whether this is really so; whether 
mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a 
pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain; we 
have evidentially arrived at a question of fact and experi-
ence, dependent, like all similar questions, on evidence. It 
can only be determined by practiced self-consciousness 
and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. 
(Mill, 1867, p. 58)
These three quotations are all part of Mill’s argument for the doc-
trine of utility being understood as a first principle of happiness, 
and claiming this principle as the final and fundamental premise 
for moral justification. Again putting that aside, what is important 
here is that Mill introduces us to a normativity that exists as a form 
of moral reasoning. What constitutes moral is a reasoning using 
both facts and principles as they manifest themselves for a particu-
lar subject and within a particular experience. This ensures that, 
even though, we to some extent can regard Mill’s moral philosophy 
as a form of principlism, it is not as such deductive in nature. On the 
contrary it is always contextualized, affirmed and arrived at through 
the actual lives of ordinary people. We might say that utility is the 
common moral suggestion (or in Mill’s vocabulary principle) that 
all the existing desires, virtues, preferences, motivations, obliga-
tions etc. seemingly, i.e. evidently, appear to evoke and make use of. 
Obviously it is a challenge for Mill, not to create his moral phi-
losophy as a subjective or egotistic normativity. Somehow he has to 
ensure that the moral reasoning that is dependent on the particu-
larities of real life, and subjectively carried out, still maintains and 
enforces an objective moral stance. Famously we have his principle 
of maximization as an attempt to do so. But throughout the text, it 
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itself. It is man’s ability to reason that gives cause for abstracting 
from the personal benefit to the common good. 
But Mill also recognizes that we are humans with emotional lives 
and fallibilities, giving us causes and motivations for action that 
may not be rationally supported and altruistic in nature. This is 
why it has to be the consequences of actions that are the marks of 
morality and not the state of mind. This door swings both ways, as 
Mill clearly states that an unselfish motivation is just as amoral as a 
selfish one, since it is the consequences that counts for the goodness 
of the deed. 
However, in order to secure as much goodness as possible and as 
much moral behavior as desirable, the perfect match is of course 
when the moral agent through his own moral reasoning comes to 
claim and fulfill an objective normativity for the benefit of all. Mill 
gives a similar account when talking about politics and the devel-
opment of society in On Liberty (1989/1859), pointing out the en-
dorsement of reason over opinion in regard to the political life. 
(Mill, 1989/1859, p. 40) In Utilitarianism there are a few indications 
of how moral reasoning can be argumentative, flexible and some-
what uncertain, but in general he seems to support a clear and dis-
tinct rationale, that confidently affirms its principles. At any means 
it seems to emerge a slight touch of idealism, in Mill’s otherwise 
quite ordinary and realistic moral philosophy.
As between his own happiness and that of others, utili-
tarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a dis-
interested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of 
Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the eth-
ics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love 
one’s neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection 
of utilitarian morality. (Mill, 1867, p. 24f)
Gathering thoughts
In this paper I have looked at Mill’s moral philosophy by reading 
his book Utilitarianism. I have looked at utility, finding it a principle 
that together with facts (of all kinds) come to shape a situated mor-
al reasoning that seems to be at the center of Mill’s idea of morality. 
All though morality in Mill’s view is something different than 
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tutes morality bear many similarities to the acquisition and foun-
dation of knowledge, where experience and the relationship be-
tween subjective reason and objective judgment are vital.  In On 
Liberty this point is also presented and of vital importance; e.g. “No 
one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judg-
ment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not 
supported by reasons, can only count as one person’s preference” 
(Mill, 1991/1859, p. 27). 
In her 1982 paper “Anything but argument?” Cora Diamond 
criticizes the idea that morality can be argued by way of a logical 
reasoning composed of acknowledged principles and empirical 
facts, establishing a rational and objective moral. She is also skep-
tical to an intuitive or transcendent moral, although the ‘philo-
sophical’ moral is her main target. Instead she tries to purpose a 
moral reasoning, or better said moral learning or maturity that is 
founded in the particular attentions that we find in our experi-
ence of life. One, or perhaps the way this morality shows itself is 
in fictional works, such as Henry James’, Wordsworth’s and Dick-
ens’. (Diamond, 1982)
A long way I agree with Diamond, but I would like to accentuate 
a stronger element of reasoning, and also introduce concepts as an 
alternative to tentativeness to situations and phenomena. Much in-
spiration for this is found in Wittgenstein, and therefore reading 
Mill, who in popular thought certainly could be characterized as 
someone Diamond attacks in her paper, by way of Wittgenstein 
made a lot of sense. 
In the paper I invite the reader to try to understand Mill’s account 
by viewing his thoughts on facts and how they appear as a form of 
certainty in human, rational behavior; as well as think of Mill’s 
struggle to comprehend utility both in terms of an abstract norm or 
normative principle and in terms of descriptive desires and inter-
ests. The core idea in Mill’s Utilitarianism, i.e. utility, can be seen as 
a core concept in Wittgenstein’s terms. One of those concepts that 
are both descriptive and normative, that we both experience and 
which also constitutes our experience, and sometimes is taken for 
granted and sometimes needs further consideration, or perhaps de-
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What we generally discover, where there is a strong dif-
ference in moral opinion, is that there are other striking 
differences in the ”worlds” of the disputants which are 
not simply ”emotional” differences, but deep disparities 
in perspective – in our views about which facts are rele-
vant and in the concepts we employ to describe the facts. 
(Pianalto, 2011, p. 260)
Conclusion
The presented conceptualization of Utility, regardless of whether it 
reflects the use of the notion in ordinary language, or Mill’s exem-
plary use in Utilitarianism, tells us that normative notions ought to 
be approached as concepts that disclose and represent essential 
ways of moral reasoning. Utility is a moral concept that stretches 
our perspective from subjective hedonism, to an objective or com-
mon good, from the outset and output of our own capacities. How-
ever it requires that we take the concept into deliberation, that we 
recognize its simultaneous descriptive and normative nature. And 
it certainly forces us to recognize and scrutinize not just emotions or 
values, but also, perhaps even to a larger extent, the facts relevant 
for the case in which the concept is applied. 
With Mill in mind, the same deliberation could be made in terms 
of a public affair, through public reason. We can discuss and debate 
the meaning of utility and collectively reason about its particular 
application, and at the same time agree on it’s per se value. It is often 
not utility that is the source of disagreement, but rather it is the cer-
tainty and the comprehension of the relevant facts, that constitute 
and is constituted by the conceptualization of utility.     
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